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This Symposium is part of a broader, national dialogue on the
reform of legal education.1  In many ways, American legal education is
fine.2  But it is not perfect.  I identify two interconnected problems.
First, legal education and practice are more disconnected than they
should be,3 a reality distinguishing law schools from other profes-
sional schools.  Second, law school imposes large direct and opportu-
nity costs on its students.  Additionally, a deficiency in academic
training and postgraduation financing of additional training impose a
Copyright  2011 by Robert J. Rhee.
* Professor of Law & Co-Director, Business Law Program, University of Maryland
School of Law; J.D., George Washington University; M.B.A., University of Pennsylvania
(Wharton); B.A., University of Chicago.  I thank my colleague Michael Millemann, who
brought this Symposium of eminent scholars and professionals to reality, and the Maryland
Law Review for its efforts in organizing and sponsoring this Symposium.  I also thank
Michael Kelly for his helpful comments.
1. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007); Sym-
posium, The Evolution of J.D. Programs—Is Non-Traditional Becoming More Traditional?, 38
SW. L. REV. 533 (2009) (collecting essays from a conference on legal education reform);
Webcast: Future Ed Conference: New Business Models for U.S. and Global Legal Educa-
tion, held by New York Law School and Harvard Law School (Apr. 9–10, 2010), http://
www.nyls.edu/centers/harlan_scholar_centers/institute_for_information_law_and_
policy/events/future_ed (follow “For Video of the Conference” hyperlink) (providing
videotape of the conference).
2. Other legal educators share this belief. See, e.g., William L. Reynolds, Back to the
Future in Law Schools, 70 MD. L. REV. 451, 453 (2011) (“[L]aw schools have been very suc-
cessful institutions for many decades, and any reform of legal education should begin with
preserving what has worked so well.”); Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal
Practice: Advocating a Common Sense Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 707, 741 (1996) (arguing that the “highly abstract legal theories” taught in
law school “do, and to a greater extent can, prove very helpful to legal practitioners in their
daily work”).
3. See Clark D. Cunningham, Should American Law Schools Continue to Graduate Lawyers
Whom Clients Consider Worthless?, 70 MD. L. REV. 499, 501 (2011) (noting that many law
firms regard recent graduates as “raw material” rather than trained professionals); Neil J.
Dilloff, The Changing Cultures and Economics of Large Law Firm Practice and Their Impact on
Legal Education, 70 MD. L. REV. 341, 355 (2011) (stating that many clients do not perceive
recent graduates as “work-ready lawyers”); Trouble with the Law, ECONOMIST, Nov. 11, 2010,
http://www.economist.com/node/17461573?story_id=17461573 (noting the comments of
Evan Chesler, of Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, who “decries ‘the difference between what
law schools teach and what lawyers do’”).
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growing financial strain on law students.4  I examine these two inter-
connected problems in the context of the strong market incentive to
reduce costs and the effects on the legal profession and legal educa-
tion.  This Essay adds a small pebble to the weight of a growing belief
that the problem is serious.
This Essay is written in four parts.  Part II sets out my perspective
on law school and the legal profession, which is based on my prior
educational and professional experiences.  Part III discusses the chal-
lenges facing legal education after the financial crisis, which may have
hastened a long-term trend toward the unbundling of legal services
and a shift from long-term relationships between law firms and clients
toward a short-term spot market for legal talent and engagement.
Part IV identifies the major flaw of legal education as the failure to
produce more market-ready lawyers with skills and knowledge to add
value more quickly in a complex and challenging practice environ-
ment.  Part V discusses some ideas for reform, ranging from the feasi-
ble, to the plausible, to the speculative.  These ideas include
curricular reform, pedagogical diversity, a focus on core skill sets, and
perhaps a more dramatic revision of the third year of law school.  I
caution that some of my viewpoints are speculative insofar as they are
based on a projection of what the future may hold.
II. A DIVERSELY FORMED PERSPECTIVE
My perspective on legal education is based on my educational
and professional experiences.5  My legal experience has run the
gamut—from clerking on the federal circuit, to representing the U.S.
government as the first-chair trial attorney in a $2.5 million HIV/AIDS
medical malpractice case in federal court, and to representing a walk-
in client on a $1,868 insurance-collection claim in municipal court.
For a time, I left the legal profession to study finance at business
school and subsequently worked as an investment banker, doing pri-
4. See Christopher T. Cunniffe, The Case for the Alternative Third-Year Program, 61 ALB. L.
REV. 85, 98–101 (1997) (discussing direct and opportunity costs incurred by law students
and noting that such costs are funded by student loans).
5. My interest in the topic of legal education is not new. See generally, e.g., Robert J.
Rhee, Follow the M.B.A. Model, NAT’L L.J., May 28, 2007, at 22 [hereinafter Rhee, M.B.A.]
(suggesting that law school pedagogy has much to learn from business schools); Robert J.
Rhee, The Madoff Scandal, Market Regulatory Failure and the Business Education of Lawyers, 35 J.
CORP. L. 363 (2009) [hereinafter Rhee, Madoff] (exploring how legal education can better
prepare business lawyers for an increasingly complex market); Robert J. Rhee, The Socratic
Method and the Mathematical Heuristic of George Po´lya, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 881 (2007) [here-
inafter Rhee, Socratic Method] (criticizing traditional legal pedagogy, such as the Socratic
method).
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marily mergers and acquisitions and corporate finance advisory work.
In this role, I was a business client, hiring and working with many
transactional lawyers from large law firms.  I have seen legal education
from the perspective of a law student, a business student, a litigator,
an investment banker, a business client, and now a law professor.
These experiences inform my teaching and scholarly agenda, as well
as my thoughts on the flaws of legal education.
My perspective on legal education is rooted in the concept of law
school as professional school rather than graduate school.  Its most
important mission is to train future lawyers to work in an increasingly
complex world.6  In its teaching mission, law schools should be rooted
in the practice of law.  To clarify a potentially contentious point, I do
not suggest that the research mission should be “practical” in the
sense that legal scholarship should cater to the practicing bar or the
bench.  To the contrary, law schools should embrace scholarship that
may be highly theoretical, abstract, or without immediate application
to a case or specific legal problem,7 though good scholarship ulti-
mately should be relevant to the empirical world.8  By and large, only
academics have the time, luxury, and resources to pursue important
6. See William R. Trail & William D. Underwood, The Decline of Professional Legal Train-
ing and a Proposal for Its Revitalization in Professional Law Schools, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 201, 216
(1996) (noting that “the practice of law is becoming increasingly complex and
specialized”).
7. I am aware of the complaint that legal scholarship is disconnected from law prac-
tice. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 41 (1992) (arguing that law schools should not “stray from
their principle mission of professional scholarship and training,” because so doing will en-
gender a larger divide between legal education and the legal profession “and society will be
the worse for it”); David Hricik & Victoria S. Salzmann, Why There Should Be Fewer Articles
Like This One: Law Professors Should Write More for Legal Decision-Makers and Less for Themselves,
38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 761, 768 (2005) (“Too much of legal scholarship is becoming ‘law
professor scholarship,’ a discourse among theorists with little practical application.”).  Yet
there is another perspective—namely that a greater understanding of the law need not
always produce scholarly works that are cited by judges and lawyers. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski,
Who Gives a Hoot About Legal Scholarship?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 295, 306–07 (2000) (suggesting
that academic scholarship may influence judges indirectly by “granting or denying legiti-
macy” to judicial decisions or to new ideas); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Commentary, Legal
Scholarship at the Crossroads: On Farce, Tragedy, and Redemption, 77 TEX. L. REV. 321, 327
(1998) (“The cause and effect relationship of a legal scholar’s labors is not an exercise in
Euclidean geometry or pool hall skill.  When a legal academic plants the seed of an
idea, . . . there is no way of knowing what effect it may ultimately have . . . .  This basic
indeterminacy is both the promise and curse of being a legal academic.”); Richard A. Pos-
ner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1325–26 (2002) (arguing that research
may be “welfare maximizing” even though it “would have absolutely no relevance to how
we live today”).  Scholarly worth need not be measured by immediate utility to practice.
8. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 7, at 1326 (concluding that the quality of legal scholar- R
ship is measured by “the test of relevance, of practical impact”).
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questions that would otherwise go unexplored because they do not
advance client interests or provide assistance to the bench.  It is worth
adding that the professional school concept does not seem to pose
obstacles to the faculty members of medical and business schools from
winning Nobel Prizes and other important scholarly achievements.
Legal education has long been criticized for being disconnected
from the needs of the legal market.9  This criticism is a generalization,
and it needs to be explored.  The extent of the problem is a function
of the sophistication of the law practice.  Law practice is stratified.10
Professor Gillian Hadfield has argued that the legal profession per-
forms two functions—one democratic/political and the other eco-
nomic.11  I suggest another form of stratification: a spectrum that
measures functionality and sophistication.  The top end of this spec-
trum includes the work of large law firms for mostly corporate and
institutional clientele.  This practice employs a minority of the total
law school graduates, and it pays the highest starting salaries.12  These
positions, along with federal clerkships, are considered the plum prize
of the law school tournament, and the demand by law school gradu-
ates probably far exceeds the supply of positions.
9. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 12–13 (noting the importance of “bridg[ing] R
the gap between analytical and practical knowledge” in legal education); see also ABA, RE-
PORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 4
(1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT], available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/pub-
lications/onlinepubs/maccrate.html (explaining that “law schools cannot reasonably be
expected” to “convert[ ] . . . students into full-fledged lawyers licensed to handle legal
matters”).  Academics and judges have also noted this disconnect. See, e.g., Edwards, supra
note 7, at 57–66 (criticizing legal pedagogy that emphasizes theoretical education at the R
expense of doctrinal instruction); Robert M. Lloyd, Hard Law Firms and Soft Law Schools, 83
N.C. L. REV. 667, 676–78 (2005) (arguing that the law school curriculum has become
“soft,” despite law firms’ need for graduates with “hard” skills).
10. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Commentary: Policy Implications, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 79, 83
(1995–1996).
11. Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of Profes-
sional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1702 (2008).  The demo-
cratic/political function includes “protecting the architecture of democratic institutions,
protecting individual rights, implementing the balance of power that promotes the norma-
tive goals of self-governance such as human dignity, autonomy, fairness, and well-being.”
Id.  The economic function entails promoting “efficient market transactions,” for example,
through the establishment of property rights and the facilitation of “contractual and orga-
nizational economic relationships.” Id.
12. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 3, at 499 (noting that junior associates at large law R
firms are generally top law students from elite schools with starting salaries “over $150,000
per year”).
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Large, sophisticated law practices are disproportionately bur-
dened by a deficient legal education system.13  By making the three-
year graduate program mandatory, legal education provides students,
if they seek it, a potential path toward a higher level of practice that
focuses on more complex problems.  In this sense, the American
three-year graduate school model is the gold standard.14  Law schools
are academically rigorous, and students think about legal problems in
a standardized way15 that has withstood the test of time and shifting
academic fads.16  There is indeed much to applaud in American legal
education.  For most law practice, three years of graduate education is
sufficient, flaws notwithstanding.17  Deficiencies in educational train-
ing are inevitable because the classroom cannot wholly substitute for
an immersion experience of independent practice, whether the
schooling is in law, medicine, or business.18  Many of these deficien-
cies are remedied in small or midsize law practice through postgradu-
13. Cf. Dilloff, supra note 3, at 359 (“No longer is it sufficient for law schools to impart R
basic substantive law, train students to think like lawyers, and prepare them to pass the bar
examination.”).
14. While American legal education is conducting a self-assessment, certain parts of the
world are following the American graduate school model.  For example, Korea has begun
transitioning from an undergraduate program to a three-year graduate school model.
Tom Ginsburg, Transforming Legal Education in Japan and Korea, 22 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV.
433, 434 (2004). I taught at Korea University College of Law in the summer of 2010.
Based on my discussions with faculty members from the law schools of Korea University
and Yonsei University, it seems that Korea is making this transition because it wants to
produce more and better lawyers. See also id. at 434 (noting that the issue in Northeast
Asian countries has been how to train more lawyers).  In the past, legal education in these
countries focused on bar examination scores.  Proponents of the graduate school model
hope that a move toward liberalizing the bar passage rate in conjunction with a graduate
model will produce lawyers better trained and more sophisticated than those who merely
passed the bar exam with high scores.  Cf. id. at 438 (noting that one goal of this process is
to ensure that Korean lawyers are equipped to serve clients across Asia).
15. See, e.g., James E. Moliterno, Legal Education, Experiential Education, and Professional
Responsibility, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 71, 81 (1996)  (noting that traditional legal education
teaches students “a single, unquestionably critical, lawyerly skill and activity through the
model of the lawyer’s retrospective thinking experience”).
16. See Daniel Thies, Rethinking Legal Education in Hard Times: The Recession, Practical
Legal Education, and the New Job Market, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 598, 611 (2010) (noting that the
legal education model “has proved remarkably resilient”).
17. See Trail & Underwood, supra note 6, at 226–27 (“What law schools can realistically R
aspire to accomplish in three years is to produce students who know basic legal doctrine,
possess certain core lawyering skills, and have experience using this knowledge and skill to
perform a reasonable range of lawyering tasks.”).
18. In the medical profession, medical students have clinic-based third and fourth
years of school, and new doctors undergo residency training.  The business profession
achieves experiential training in the opposite manner.  Admission to most top business
schools requires substantial work experience, and upon graduation, the professionals are
inserted back into the market.
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ation mentoring, experience, perseverance, and due care.19  Indeed,
personal mentoring and training at smaller organizations may be
more readily available than in larger organizations, where such
mentoring may be hit or miss depending on senior lawyer initiative
and organizational design.20
Generally, large law firms serve the most sophisticated clients—
mostly corporations and other complex entities with the most difficult
legal problems.  Since law schools must train the Wall Street and K
Street lawyers, as well as the Main Street lawyers, law schools with aspi-
rations of national reputation and impact must have curricula capable
of training the top end of law practice.  In turn, such a program would
have downstream benefits for students who go on to other kinds of
law practice.  Tuition increases that outpace inflation and the cost of
goods are ultimately supported by students’ expectation that future
income will service their debt load.21  The economic engine of legal
education is powered by the salary bases of large firms, which are
largely financed by corporate and institutional clientele.22  It is now
commonly known that the starting salaries of graduating students are
bimodal.23  In 2009, the national median and mean of postgraduate
salaries were $72,000 and $93,454 respectively, but very few students
actually earned salaries near the median or mean.24  Instead, salaries
clustered around two modes: one around $160,000 and the other
19. See Leslie C. Levin, Preliminary Reflections on the Professional Development of Solo and
Small Law Firm Practitioners, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 847, 878 (2001) (explaining that lawyers in
small law firms receive more training than commonly thought). But see MACCRATE REPORT,
supra note 9, at 47 (stating that lawyers entering small practice are forced to “rely on their R
legal education for learning practice competencies” because they lack the “mentor[s], col-
legial support [and] on-the-job training” typically associated with large firm practice).
20. See, e.g., Joyce S. Sterling & Nancy Reichman, So, You Want to be a Lawyer? The Quest
for Professional Status in a Changing Legal World, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2289, 2294 (2010)
(stating that some partners in large firms “have become reluctant to devote their limited
time to socialization and training”).
21. Cf. Elie Mystal, The Next Bubble: Law School Tuition, ABOVE THE LAW (Apr. 27, 2010,
1:34 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/04/the-next-bubble-law-school-tuition (challeng-
ing the traditional assumption, made by Professor Christine Hurt and others, that a legal
education is a “‘good investment’”).
22. See Judith Welch Wegner, Response: More Complicated Than We Think, 59 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 623, 628 (2010) (stating that large, private firm salaries may make larger “‘debt
loads more tolerable’”).
23. See, e.g., Salary Distribution Curve, NALP, http://www.nalp.org/salarydistrib (last vis-
ited Dec. 29, 2010) (displaying graphs that show the bimodal distribution of reported full-
time legal salaries).
24. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Inc., Market for Law Graduates
Changes with Recession: Class of 2009 Faced New Challenges (July 22, 2010), available at
http://www.nalp.org/uploads/Class_of_09_Jobs_and_JDs_Report_Press_Release.pdf.
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around $40,000–$65,000.25  Law school tuitions are not sustainable
without the prospect of the higher salary mode.26
My perspective is not that, as client matters go, the legal problems
of corporate and institutional clients are inherently more important
than the problems of the average person in need of a good lawyer—
they are not.  We cannot make value judgments about the intrinsic
worth of the various interests protected by lawyers.  The point here
concerns student needs and expectations.  We must acknowledge that
an important reason why students assume the enormous direct and
opportunity costs of law school is the prospect of a career with an
anticipated economic return;27 being a lawyer is a career that supports
one’s living, family, and lifestyle.  Law schools with national aspira-
tions must satisfy the educational, professional, and economic needs
and expectations of all students.  This requires opening more oppor-
tunities for students who will be doing the most sophisticated legal
work under the demanding conditions for which graduates are paid
the highest wages or are otherwise compensated.
III. RECESSION-INDUCED CHANGES IN THE LEGAL MARKET
Since I entered law school over two decades ago, not much has
changed in legal education.28  The first-year curriculum is largely the
same, as is the basic teaching pedagogy—some form of Socratic dia-
logue in conjunction with the traditional law school casebook
method.29  Some things have changed, of course.  Clinical education
25. See id.  For a graph showing this distribution, see Salary Distribution Curve, supra note
23. R
26. See John O. Sonsteng et al., A Legal Education Renaissance: A Practical Approach for the
Twenty-First Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 303, 360 (2007) (citing a survey that indi-
cated the amount of debt incurred by law students prevents many students from pursuing
employment in the public sector).
27. See Wegner, supra note 22, at 628 (acknowledging that some students enter law R
school “hoping for an economic return on their educational investment”).  In light of high
tuition rates, rising student debt, and difficult economic times, some have begun to ques-
tion the adequacy of the economic return on a law school education. See David Segal, Is
Law School a Losing Game, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011.
28. One major change is that law schools have made significant strides toward achiev-
ing more diverse and international student bodies. See Cruz Reynoso & Cory Amron, Diver-
sity in Legal Education: A Broader View, a Deeper Commitment, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 491, 491
(2002) (noting that law schools “have become increasingly committed to enrolling a stu-
dent body [that] represent[s] a diversity of backgrounds and perspectives”).  This trend
reflects important economic changes, beyond the obvious advancement of progressive val-
ues and our society’s changing demographics.  In an era of globalization and rising new
economies across the world, clients are increasingly more diverse and international.  The
legal profession should reflect this economic and social diversity.
29. See Moliterno, supra note 15, at 74–75 (stating that typical legal education in the R
1980s “us[ed] appellate cases as the basis for a Socratic dialogue”).
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and experiential learning have become more prominent.30  Law
schools also offer many more concentrations in specialized areas of
law, funneling students through centers, institutes, and certificate pro-
grams.  Specialization provides curricular form to the largely amor-
phous and student-driven upper-level curriculum.31  Other than these
developments, legal education has remained largely the same: law
school is still traditionally three years; the education is still founded
on the common law and on a litigation perspective; appellate cases,
statutes, and regulations dominate the materials studied and drive the
pedagogy.
The static nature of legal education contrasts with the dynamic
landscape of the legal profession.32  Over the past several decades, the
legal profession has undergone a structural change.33  Law firms have
grown in both national and international scope.34 Salaries and lever-
age (the ratio of associates to partner) have increased along with eco-
nomic pressures and competition.35  The law firm itself is no longer a
strong web of long-term professional relationships among attorneys,
firms, and clients.36  The market for legal services is moving from one
of long-term relationships toward one of more temporary contractual
arrangements akin to a spot market for legal talent.37
30. See Russell Engler, The MacCrate Report Turns 10: Assessing Its Impact and Identifying
Gaps We Should Seek to Narrow, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 109, 144 (2001) (noting that “the Mac-
Crate Report gave a substantial boost to clinical pedagogy and to clinics”).
31. See Jeffrey E. Lewis, “Advanced” Legal Education in the Twenty-First Century: A Prediction
of Change, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 655, 657 (2000) (noting the increasing number of certificate
programs in American law schools and explaining that such programs typically “consume
approximately one-half of the ‘true electives’ that are otherwise available” to upper-level
students).
32. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second
Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1875–76 (2008)  (correlating law
firm changes with the increased size and changed context of many firms and noting re-
cent, dramatic changes in large law firm practice).
33. Marc Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger: The Promotion-to-Partner
Tournament and the Growth of Large Law Firms, 76 VA. L. REV. 747, 749 (1990).
34. See, e.g., Neil Irwin, Piper Rudnick to Merge with Big British Firm, WASH. POST, Dec. 6,
2004, at E01 (describing a merger that created “one of the largest combinations ever of law
firms from different countries”).
35. Galanter & Palay, supra note 33, at 752–53; Rex S. Heinke, Putting Associate Salaries R
into Perspective, L.A. COUNTY BAR ASS’N, http://www.lacba.org/showpage.cfm?pageid=1288
(last visited Dec. 29, 2010) (explaining that large law firms must continually raise associate
salaries to remain competitive in the legal market).
36. See, e.g., Dilloff, supra note 3, at 349 (arguing that the increased lateral mobility of R
lawyers, which characterizes the contemporary legal profession, “has made large law firms
less stable and partners less trusting of each other”).
37. See RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?  RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL
SERVICES 29–33 (2008) (describing the increasing commoditization of most legal services).
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In the past several years, the legal profession has also changed in
response to the recent financial crisis.38  The crisis was the most seri-
ous since the Great Depression39 and has had a profound impact on
both domestic society and the global economy.40  In its nadir, the total
market capitalization of companies listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ
lost approximately half of their value, relative to their value in Octo-
ber of 2007.41  As a service industry, the legal profession trails the
broader economy.42  By now, we are familiar with the discouraging
stories of partner and associate layoffs, salary reductions, and deferred
start dates.43  The effects of these problems flow down to law schools
and legal education.44
We do not know whether these effects are temporary or perma-
nent.  One thought is that once the economy recovers, so too will the
It is beyond the scope of this Essay to inquire further into the reasons why law firms exist
and the strength of the contractual relationships among their factors of production.
38. See Michelle M. Harner, The Value of “Thinking Like a Lawyer,” 70 MD. L. REV. 390,
394–400 (2011) (describing the impact of the economic recession on the legal profession);
Thies, supra note 16, at 599–608 (outlining how the economic recession may impact the R
legal services market).
39. Josh Bivens, Worst Economic Crisis Since the Great Depression? By a Long Shot, ECON.
POL’Y INST. (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.epi.org/economic_snapshots/entry/snapshot_
20100127.
40. See MARTIN NEIL BAILEY & DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT, BROOKINGS INST., THE U.S. FINAN-
CIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS: WHERE DOES IT STAND AND WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 16
(2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0615_eco-
nomic_crisis_baily_elliott/0615_economic_crisis_baily_elliott.pdf (noting that “[t]he eco-
nomic and financial crisis that originated here has spread around the world”); Sara
Murray, Slump Over, Pain Persists, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2010, at A1 (describing the domestic
effects of the economic recession).
41. See Robert J. Rhee, Fiduciary Exemption for Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public
Good, and the Hobson’s Choice During a National Crisis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 661, 667 n.28
(2010) (describing the halving of the Standard & Poor’s 500 index closing numbers be-
tween October 2007 and March 2009).
42. See Bruce MacEwen, Perspective on the Unlikely and the Impossible, COMPENSATION &
BENEFITS FOR L. OFF., Feb. 2009, at 7 (suggesting that the legal industry, “a lagging indus-
try,” is likely to pull out of the recession later than the rest of the economy).
43. See, e.g., Gina Passarella, Drinker Biddle to Enlist Class in Basic Training: Firm Avoids
Deferral for Incoming Associates, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 12, 2009, at 1 (highlighting
“Drinker Biddle & Reath’s decision to reduce first-year associate starting salaries for the
first six months of the year . . . in favor of creating a training program”); Amanda Royal,
Law Firm Salary Cuts Keep on Coming, LAW.COM, May 4, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/arti-
cle.jsp?id=1202430403772 (noting the trend of lowering associate salaries).
44. For instance, here at University of Maryland School of Law, the effects have been
felt by students and faculty alike.  Students, like their peers across the country, are finding
the job market tight, and for the past three years, faculty and staff salaries have been re-
duced by mandatory furloughs. See Dana Mattioli & Sara Murray, Employers Hit Salaried Staff
with Furloughs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2009, at D1 (describing University of Maryland’s “scaled
approach” to furloughs).
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demand for legal services.45  I am not as sanguine.  Some of the
changes in the legal profession will prove more durable, suggesting
the financial crisis may have accelerated a long-term trend toward
greater rationalization of legal services.46  I base this claim on the pre-
mise that once the market finds a source of efficiency, the new state
will become the norm.47
What will be the source of this new efficiency?  The billable hour
model has long been viewed with some suspicion.48  Defenders may
argue that it incentivizes proper representation.49  The billable hour is
also the most important measure of productivity in a firm, and it is not
uncommon for attorneys to wear their billable hours as badges of ac-
complishment.50  The potential for agency cost is obvious.51  The billa-
ble hour model supports a leveraged law firm structure, such as the
pyramid structure that has a wide base of associates producing a large
volume of billable hours, thus increasing partner profitability.52 From
the client’s perspective, there is plenty of room to complain, particu-
larly in tough economic times.53  The billable hour model incentivizes
45. See Thies, supra note 16, at 603 (“It is possible that, like all good businesses, law R
firms are simply adapting to a weak spot in the market and preparing to return to business
as usual as soon as the economy improves.”).
46. See Heather Timmons, Outsourcing to India Draws Western Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
4, 2010, at B1 (noting the increasing trend toward outsourcing and unbundling legal work
such as document review and due diligence).
47. Cf. Evan N. Turgeon, Boom and Bust for Whom?: The Economic Philosophy Behind the
2008 Financial Crisis, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 139, 142 (2009) (referencing Adam Smith’s
theory that a free market “produc[es] an efficient distribution of goods” and “guides the
economy to a stable equilibrium”).
48. See, e.g., Douglas McCollam, The Billable Hour: Are Its Days Numbered?, AM. LAW., Nov.
28, 2005, http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1132653918886 (describing
the billable hour as “the cockroach of the legal world”).
49. Cf. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898–900 & n.16 (1984) (noting that billable
hours and rates in fee awards in federal civil rights cases are based on the complexity of the
case and the attorney effort required for proper representation).
50. See Dilloff, supra note 3, at 354 (noting that until recently associate success was R
measured by the number of hours billed).
51. Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 769 (“Hourly bill-
ing . . . can exacerbate lawyer-client agency costs because it tempts law firms to spend
unnecessary time and client money.”); see also McCollam, supra note 48 (“The basic flaw of R
the billable hour, say its detractors, is that it puts the financial incentives for lawyers in the
wrong place.”).
52. See McCollam, supra note 48. R
53. See, e.g., Susan Saab Fortney, I Don’t Have Time to be Ethical: Addressing the Effects of
Billable Hour Pressure, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 305, 308 (2003) (stating that “the frustration over
hourly billing has mushroomed to the point where attorney and client complaints have
reached a fevered pitch”); Jonathan D. Glater, Billable Hours Giving Ground at Law Firms,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009, at A1 (noting that long-standing client complaints about the
billable hour have increased due to the “rough economic climate”).
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inefficiency, and some training of junior attorneys is surely funded on
the client’s dime.54
The recent stress on the legal profession has added to the pres-
sure on the billable hour model,55 raising the question of whether the
leveraged law firm structure will decline in the future.  I do not know
what the legal market will look like in the next five years, let alone a
longer period.  Lacking foresight, I simply note that there will be in-
creasing pressure for efficiency in the delivery of legal services.
This point was made clearer to me in a conference presentation
by Chester Paul Beach,56 Associate General Counsel of United Tech-
nologies Corporation (“UTC”), a public company with a market capi-
talization of approximately $70 billion.57  The company has
approximately 240 in-house lawyers.58  According to Beach, the com-
pany spends about $125 million for external legal services59 and has
reduced external legal costs from about thirty-three basis points
(0.33%) of revenue to twenty-two basis points (0.22%) over a ten-year
period (1999–2008) with no loss in quality of representation.60
A seemingly mild-mannered lawyer, Beach made provocative as-
sertions during his presentation that caught the ear of the attendees61:
54. Cf. James Backman, Externships and New Lawyer Mentoring: The Practicing Lawyer’s Role
in Educating New Lawyers, 24 BYU J. PUB. L. 65, 112 (2009) (noting that “clients increasingly
refuse to cover billable hours for young lawyers while they are . . . [completing] their
training program”).
55. Dilloff, supra note 3, at 354. R
56. The conference was co-hosted by New York Law School and Harvard Law School in
April 2010. Subsequently, I had an e-mail dialogue with Mr. Beach, who clarified the com-
ments he made at the conference and augmented his thoughts.  E-mail from Chester Paul
Beach, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, United Techs. Corp., to Robert J. Rhee, Professor of Law,
Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law (Aug. 13, 2010) [hereinafter Beach E-mail] (on file with author).
57. United Technologies (UTX), YAHOO! FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=UTX (last
visited Dec. 29, 2010).
58. Webcast: Future Ed Conference: New Business Models for U.S. and Global Legal
Education, Panel 1, held by New York Law School and Harvard Law School, at
00:37:20–00:37:25 (Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.nyls.edu/centers/harlan_scholar_centers/
institute_for_information_law_and_policy/events/future_ed (follow “For Video of the
Conference” hyperlink; then select “Future Ed Conference—Panel 1” hyperlink) [herein-
after Future Ed Conference, Panel 1] (remarks of Chester Paul Beach, Assoc. Gen. Coun-
sel of United Techs. Corp.).
59. Id. at 00:36:16–00:36:20.
60. See id. at 00:39:55–00:40:15; see also Beach E-mail, supra note 56.  A basis point is R
one-hundredth of one percent (.01%): “Basis points are used in computing investment
yields . . . and in apportioning costs and calculating interest rates in real-estate transac-
tions.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 145–46 (7th ed. 1999).
61. Beach’s presentation was covered by the media. See, e.g., Elie Mystal, Corporate Gen-
eral Counsel Puts Fear of God into Legal Educators (and You Should Be Worried Too), ABOVE THE
LAW (Apr. 9, 2010, 6:08 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/04/corporate-general-coun-
sel-puts-fear-of-god-into-legal-educators-and-you-should-be-worried-too.
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• The company is “passionate about killing the hourly rate,” and
the company is “trying to actively destroy the current model.”62
• The company does not want to pay inflated associate billable
hours.  It does not allow first- and second-year associates to
work on projects without “special permission” because they
“are worthless.”63
• The company is “not a client . . . I’m a customer 90% of the
time.”64
• “I’m a customer 90% of the time, and as much as it might pain
all of us to think about it, I am basically buying a commodity.”
Accordingly, the company is seeking ways to unbundle legal
services.65
• The company seeks “cost-efficiency and results. . . .  We expect
year-over-year price reduction.”66
• Management principles dictate that in-house counsel “reduce
the cost of legal services to our enterprise as a function of
revenue.”67
These comments are striking because they go to the heart of the
current business model of large law firms and to the sustainability of a
highly leveraged organizational structure.68  They are not the out-of-
turn rant of an overzealous employee.69
62. Future Ed Conference, Panel 1, supra note 58, at 00:40:18–00:40:51 (remarks of R
Chester Paul Beach, Assoc. Gen. Counsel of United Techs. Corp.).
63. Id. at 00:42:18–00:42:35, 00:49:29–00:49:40.  Beach subsequently clarified that,
rather than “worthless,” these associates are “worth (far) less.”  Beach E-mail, supra note 56. R
64. Id. at 00:35:57–00:36:25.  The full transcript, as Beach recited to me in an e-mail is
as follows:
First a terminological point, I am not a client.  A client is someone who has a
relationship to a learned and esteemed professional advisor and a counsel.  Don’t
think of me as a client, because I am only a client about 10% of the time in the
$125M a year we spend on legal services around the world.  I’m a customer 90%
of the time and as much as it might pain all of us to think about it I am basically
buying a commodity.  I can buy it from an awful lot of people.  There’s a surplus
of suppliers for 90% of what I buy in the market in this country and in the other
countries where we do business and I am really interested in cost, efficiency and
results.
Beach E-mail, supra note 56. R
65. Future Ed Conference, Panel 1, supra note 58, at 00:36:25–00:36:30, R
00:42:32–00:43:36 (remarks of Chester Paul Beach, Assoc. Gen. Counsel of United Techs.
Corp.).
66. Id. at 00:36:40–00:36:45, 00:39:52–00:39:55.
67. Id. at 00:38:54–00:39:14.
68. See Thies, supra note 16, at 600 (suggesting that the ability of a leveraged structure R
to maximize profits per partner is a function of the billable hour).
69. See also Dilloff, supra note 3, at 353 (noting that in addition to United Technolo- R
gies, other large corporations, such as Pfizer and Tyco, have entered into alternative fee
arrangements with law firms).
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The financial implications of Beach’s assertions tell an interesting
story.  In 2009, UTC recognized revenue of $52.9 billion and earned
$3.8 billion in net income attributable to common shareholders.70  Its
market capitalization was approximately $70 billion as of November
19, 2010, which entails a trailing price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio of
18x.71  An eleven basis-point reduction in external legal cost based on
2009 revenue72 would result in $58 million in pretax cost saving, or
about $42 million in after-tax contribution to profit.73  At a multiple
of 18x earning, this translates into an increase of about $750 million
to the company’s stock value.74  These numbers represent the type of
value-maximizing decisions and outcomes that catch the attention of
chief executives, corporate boards, and shareholders.
These numbers suggest another implication.  Beach stated that
the reduction in price of legal services also coincided with equal or
better quality.75  But suppose the company experiences worse out-
comes.  United Technologies Corporation can stand to suffer from
inferior legal services as long as the lost value does not exceed the cost
savings.76  The more salient point is that legal risk management
should be subject to a cost-benefit analysis.  The “gold-standard” rep-
resentation—the commitment of vast or expensive resources to every
level of a legal problem or task—is not necessarily the best type of
legal service from the perspective of value-creation.77
70. UNITED TECHS. CORP., 2009 UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION ANNUAL STATE-
MENT: FIVE-YEAR SUMMARY 38 (2009), available at http://utc.com/UTCReports/Company%
20Reports/Annual%20Reports/2009/pdfs/UT_2009_UT-Financials.pdf.
71. See United Technologies, YAHOO! FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=utx (last vis-
ited Dec. 29, 2010).  The price-to-earnings ratio is “[t]he ratio between a stock’s current
share price and the corporation’s earnings per share for the last year.” BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY, supra note 60, at 1080. R
72. See supra text accompanying note 60. R
73. This assumes that UTC’s effective tax rate on pretax profit is approximately twenty-
eight percent.
74. Another way to think about this is that approximately 1.4% of the market value of
UTC (or $750 million of $52.9 billion) is attributable to the efficiency gain from reduced
legal costs achieved over a ten year period.
75. See Beach E-mail, supra note 56; supra text accompanying note 60. R
76. Beach made clear that this proposition is true as an academic point, but “we abso-
lutely don’t think about legal risk management in this way.”  Beach E-mail, supra note 56. R
77. On this point, Beach adds:
The more important point is that our cost and productivity initiatives proceed
from the premise that legal services as we have purchased them from traditional
large, vertically-integrated firms have been provided in such an inefficient and
wasteful manner (including without limitation, your ‘gold standard’ approach)
that vast improvement are possible WITHOUT any measurable increase in risk.
Beach E-mail, supra note 56. R
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We can extrapolate a bit further.  Fortune 500 companies most
recently generated a combined $9.76 trillion in revenue.78  With even
a five basis-point reduction from revenue in legal cost, a company
would earn an additional $3.2 billion in profit.79  Assume a multiple of
25x earnings.80  This implies an additional $80 billion in equity value
to the S&P 500, or about the market capitalization of McDonald’s;81 at
ten basis points, the level claimed by UTC, the addition to equity value
is $160 billion, or about the market value of Johnson & Johnson.82
One may quibble on the margins of these back-of-the-envelope
calculations.  Whatever the more precise figures and projections are,
the larger point is inescapable: Seemingly minute increases in cost ef-
ficiencies create substantial value for firms.  It would be a mistake to
take Beach’s provocative statements—“killing the hourly rate” and
“destroy[ing] the current model”—as the hyperbole of an overenthu-
siastic in-house counsel.  They plainly communicate the strong market
incentive for rationalization and measurement of legal services in cor-
porate America.83
Thomas Sager, General Counsel of DuPont, expressed a similar
sentiment in a keynote presentation at a recent conference on alterna-
tive litigation financing.84  He explained that DuPont’s in-house legal
department is not simply a cost center for the company but supports
revenue generation by more effectively prosecuting intellectual prop-
erty claims.  His message was that the company’s in-house legal depart-
ment should be considered an integrated business unit with
independent responsibilities for profit and cost.  He emphasized the
78. See Fortune 500, CNNMONEY.COM (May, 3 2010), http://money.cnn.com/
magazines/fortune/fortune500/2010/full_list/index.html (author’s calculation) (provid-
ing revenue data per company).
79. This assumes net of taxes based on a 34% rate.
80. Since 1990, the average monthly price earnings (“P/E”) ratio for the S&P 500 has
been 25.9x. See S&P 500 P/E/ Ratio, MULTPL, http://www.multpl.com/table?f=m (last vis-
ited Dec. 30, 2010) (providing historic data). The P/E for March 1, 2010 was 21.00x. Id.
81. See McDonald’s Corp. (MDC), YAHOO! FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q?d=t&s=MCD
(last visited Nov. 19, 2010).  On November 19, 2010, the market capitalization of McDon-
ald’s was $84 billion.
82. See Johnson & Johnson (NYSE:JNJ), FORBES.COM, http://finapps.forbes.com/finapps/
jsp/finance/compinfo/CIAtAGlance.jsp?tkr=JNJ (last visited Nov. 9, 2010).  On November
19, 2010, the market capitalization of Johnson & Johnson was $175 billion.
83. But see William L. Reynolds, Back to the Future in Law Schools, 70 MD. L. REV. 451, 451
n.1 (2011) (arguing that “[c]lients dealing with very large sums of money are not going to
concern themselves with this sort of ‘loose change’”).
84. The two day conference, sponsored by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice, was
titled “Alternative Litigation Finance in the U.S.: Where Are We and Where Are We
Headed with Practice and Policy?”. See Events, RAND CORP., http://www.rand.org/events/
2010/05/20 (last visited Dec. 30, 2010).  Sager presented the keynote talk on May 21, 2010,
the second day of the conference. Id.
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broad message that in-house counsel should be focused on the com-
pany’s bottom line.
Sager’s message was consistent with Beach’s in this respect: Both
senior in-house lawyers spoke to the inefficiency in the legal profes-
sion. By implication, this criticism touches law schools.  As their com-
ments imply, in-house counsel are not just the chief internal legal
advisers to the CEO and the board of directors but are also purchas-
ing agents for legal services that facilitate the company’s business.85
As Professor John Coffee observed, in-house general counsel has be-
come “as much a general manager of legal services as an actual coun-
selor to management.”86  Commentators have noted such changes in
the market forces steering the legal profession, suggesting that the
practice of law on behalf of corporate clients has shifted from a pro-
fession to a business.87  The rise of in-house counsel has led to greater
price transparency and opportunities to rationalize legal services, re-
sulting in greater economic pressure on external attorneys.88
In a different time, when the relationships among clients, firms,
and attorneys were stickier, clients could rationally subsidize the train-
ing of junior attorneys because they could expect to capture much of
the benefits in subsequent years as the attorneys climbed upward on
the law firm ladder.89  In the different context of corporate philan-
thropy, this is the type of long-term strategic vision that drives corpo-
rations to contribute to social institutions and initiatives.90  The
application of such vision to the client-law firm relationship depends
85. See Lisa H. Nicholson, Making In-Roads to Corporate General Counsel Positions: It’s Only
a Matter of Time?, 65 MD. L. REV. 625, 633 (2006) (noting that general counsel “perform
multiple other roles apart from legal counselor, including serving as business advisers,
compliance officers, problem solvers, and cost-center managers”).
86. JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
224 (2006).
87. See, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A
CROSSROAD 136 (2006) (arguing that the legal profession has “become less professional
and more like [a] business[ ]”); Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Call-
ing, 49 MD. L. REV. 255, 291 (1990) (acknowledging a deterioration in “[t]he ideal of law as
a public profession”).
88. See COFFEE, supra note 86, at 224 (describing a shift in the balance of power be- R
tween in-house and external counsel); see also Galanter & Henderson, supra note 32, at R
1897  (“With the increased sophistication and bureaucratization of corporate legal depart-
ments, general counsel became less reliant on law firm referral networks to find capable
lawyers in other cities.”).
89. Cf. Robert W. Hillman, The Hidden Costs of Lawyer Mobility: Of Law Firms, Law Schools,
and the Education of Lawyers, 91 KY. L.J. 299, 303 (2002–2003) (observing that “lawyer mobil-
ity serves as a disincentive for investment by firms in the training and development of their
lawyers”).
90. See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 582–83 (N.J. 1953) (describing a
corporation’s interest in contributing to philanthropic causes). See generally Michael E.
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on two facts: (1) whether clients see their relationship with outside
counsel as a commercial relationship based on the best combination
of price and quality; and (2) whether the relationship between firms
and attorneys is substantially based on economic returns for both.  In
this respect, the market segment of large law firms may be moving
from stable relationships based on long-term relational commitment
to a short-term spot market for legal talent and engagements.91 As the
capital markets teach us, a move from long-term to short-term con-
tracts often results in volatility in price and volume.92  For a client who
depends on short-term contracts for legal services, a long-term invest-
ment in training external lawyers does not make much sense, as there
is no substantial recoupment of the investment.93
I do not know whether the billable hour model has been mortally
wounded by the recent financial crisis, but it is reasonable to believe
that the model of the billable hour with high leverage may no longer
be a viable model for some firms if commoditization, unbundling of
some aspects of legal services, improvements in outcome measure-
ment, and other efficiency-driven processes continue to advance.94  If
clients continue to pay billable hours for engagement staffing at in-
flated rates, then either they believe that the model works for the mat-
ter at hand, or they have not yet figured out a better alternative.  What
strategies will corporate clients pursue to ration legal services?  What
cost efficiencies are achievable?  What is the optimum balance of qual-
ity and cost?  The answers are anyone’s guess, but I suspect that corpo-
rations will continue to experiment because legal service can have a
significant financial impact on the bottom line.95  A key problem is
measurement: how should a client measure the sliding scale between
Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy and Society: The Link Between Competitive Advantage and
Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2006, at 78.
91. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. R
92. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Rumor Control and Disclosure of Merger Negotiations or
Other Control-Related Transactions: Full Disclosure or “No Comment”—The Only Safe Harbors, 46
MD. L. REV. 954, 956 (1987) (noting that an emphasis on short-term investments results in
“volatile markets that are significantly affected by rumors”).
93. Professor Hadfield questions whether the homogenous nature of curriculum and
pedagogy best serves a segmented legal market:
Law students graduate law school ill-prepared to participate directly in solving the
complex legal problems faced by business clients, and so law firms are organized
on a tight hierarchy that keeps most beginning lawyers away from client interac-
tion and strategic decision making until well into their careers.
Hadfield, supra note 11, at 1722–23.  The additional wrinkle here is that corporate clients R
may no longer readily pay for the base of this pyramidal hierarchy. See Dilloff, supra note 3, R
at 355 (“[L]earning at the clients’ expense is history.”).
94. See supra note 37; supra notes 55–67 and accompanying text. R
95. See supra text accompanying notes 70–73. R
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outcome and price or analyze the marginal costs and benefits of legal
risk management?96  In this respect, clients and lawyers may have dif-
ferent perspectives on legal risk.  Whereas clients may prefer some
risk, lawyers presume that it is best to eliminate all identifiable legal
risk.97  This disjunction is probably common, and it is ripe with the
possibility of miscommunication and misunderstanding.98  (I say this
with my past experience as a business client in mind.)  As assessment
techniques mature, we should expect to see continuing price pres-
sures on the legal industry.
The implication of the above digression is that corporate clients
may continue to fund the training of lawyers in firms closely con-
nected to their business, but as law firms compete for short-term rela-
tionships and discrete engagements, this may no longer hold true as a
general proposition.99  There is not enough of a return on the client’s
investment, and funding training in the context of short-term rela-
tionships enhances the free rider problem.100  In those situations, the
client wants an immediate return.101  If so, as I have previously sug-
gested, “training and education are not free.  They must be funded in
some way.”102  If clients are not willing to subsidize training, someone
must bear the cost: associates in the form of lower salaries, partners in
the form of lower profits, law firms in the form of increased business
risk, or law schools.103
96. Beach notes that the measure of outcomes and quality is a “daunting challenge.”
Beach E-mail, supra note 56. R
97. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of
Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 377–78 (1997) (suggesting
that lawyers “knowingly overstate . . . legal risk” when advising their clients to ensure the
importance of their services and to avoid the personal and economic consequences of
giving advice that costs the client money).
98. Id. at 376 (exploring the possibility that lawyers overstate risk to their clients, which
causes “economic actors [to] act upon” information that “may well be different from the
law as objectively understood,” and, in turn, undermines “the efficiency of the ‘received’
law”).
99. See supra text accompanying note 93. R
100. See Eric E. Johnson, A Populist Manifesto for Learning the Law, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 41,
55 (2010) (“In economists’ terms, a ‘free-rider problem’ arises when people refrain from
engaging in some socially beneficial pursuit because those people anticipate that others
will be able to derive a benefit without putting forth any of their own effort or
investment.”).
101. Cf. Dilloff, supra note 3, at 345–46 (observing that law firms expect newly hired R
attorneys “to begin working in a productive and client-worthy capacity as soon as
possible”).
102. Rhee, Madoff, supra note 5, at 390. R
103. See id. (“Either employers absorb the cost of legal training—obviously undesirable
from the law firm’s perspective—or law schools graduate students with more directly appli-
cable skill sets.”).
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IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH LEGAL EDUCATION
Newly minted lawyers are not market-ready.104  Because they must
undergo a substantial training period, salaries at the top end of the
entry-level market must be seen as subsidized wages.  What are the
problems with legal education that create a greater need for post-
graduation training?  My answer focuses on curricular issues.
First, I think the first two years of law school are mostly fine.105  It
takes time and effort to learn our legal system—one in which there is
significant interaction between case law, statutes, and regulations—
and the complex branches of government that create and administer
these laws.  The first two years of law school teach the difficult skill of
“thinking like a lawyer” within basic, doctrinally important areas of law
such as contracts, property, torts, constitutional law, and civil
procedure.106
There is room, however, for improvement in curriculum.  As Pro-
fessor Lisa Fairfax noted in her symposium presentation, the core cur-
riculum—if not most of law school—is litigation focused107: students
read cases and write briefs, a practice nicely complemented by the
Socratic method of teaching case law.108  Yet, litigation is not the only
aspect of law practice.  As Professor Hadfield suggested in her sympo-
sium presentation, contract law could be taught from a transactional
perspective.109  Since most tort cases settle and courts actively resolve
only a minute fraction of matters,110 even tort law could be taught
104. See Sonsteng et al., supra note 26, at 318 (listing necessary “skill areas” in which law R
schools do not provide sufficient training.
105. See Reynolds, supra note 83, at 454–57 (defending the first-year law school curricu- R
lum); see also Sonsteng et al., supra note 26, at 332 (“The results of the [1979 ABA-commis- R
sioned] Cramton Report concluded that, at best, legal education was providing students a
two-year program with a fairly useless third year.” (footnote omitted)).
106. For a succinct summary of the concept of “thinking like a lawyer,” see Harner,
supra note 38, at 390–94. R
107. Lydia Nussbaum, Executive Summary, The Profession and the Academy: Address-
ing Major Changes in Law Practice (May 27, 2010) (unpublished symposium summary)
(on file with the Maryland Law Review).
108. Cf. Lisa T. McElroy, From Grimm to Glory: Simulated Oral Argument as a Component of
Legal Education’s Signature Pedagogy, 84 IND. L.J. 589, 601 (2009) (“The Socratic method, in
which the professor asks students questions about the cases they have read and put forth
hypotheticals about potential future application of already-established rules, is similar to
oral argument in many ways.”).
109. For a description of Professor Hadfield’s transactional contracts course, see Gillian
K. Hadfield, Equipping the Garage Guys in Law, 70 MD. L. REV. 484 (2011).
110. Gregg D. Polsky & Dan Markel, Taxing Punitive Damages, 96 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1335
& n.103 (2010) (stating that “[a]n extremely large percentage of tort cases already settle
under current law” and noting that only three percent of all tort cases “reach a jury ver-
dict” while the rest are dismissed or settled (citing JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW:
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 40 (2d ed. 2008))).
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through a transactional filter at times.  I do not suggest that a litiga-
tion focus is bad. The study of cases sharpens legal analytical skills,
which are the prerequisite for transactional work.111  But, the singular
focus on litigation is misleading to the neophyte and can lead to defi-
ciencies in perspective and skills.
By focusing on litigation, law schools deemphasize the transac-
tional nature of law practice and fail to expose students to this impor-
tant aspect of a lawyer’s work.  This is quite evident from the first-year
required curriculum.  All law schools require students to learn the
Rules of Civil Procedure, and yet most do not require course work or
training in alternative dispute resolution.112  Most first-year legal writ-
ing courses focus on writing an appellate brief.113  This is a good exer-
cise because brief writing is a demanding, precise art.  Once a student
acquires this skill, we assume she can apply it to other tasks.  Even if
this assumption is true, the skill does not transfer to all other impor-
tant legal writing contexts.  Drafting contracts, opinion letters, legal
memoranda, settlement agreements, and corporate transactional doc-
uments are different from writing appellate briefs in important ways,
such as length, tone, style, and purpose.  Where boilerplate terms are
important, even the principles of good writing are subordinated to a
higher transactional purpose.114
Another significant deficiency in legal education is its singular fo-
cus on legal analysis almost to the exclusion of other skill sets and
knowledge bases.115  As Professor Michael Kelly has argued, law stu-
111. Stephen R. Alton, Roll Over Langdell, Tell Llewellyn the News: A Brief History of American
Legal Education, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 339, 351 (2010) (“The main argument in favor of
the case method of instruction has been its ability to teach the skill of thinking like a
lawyer—the skill of critical thinking and analysis that forms the basis of legal problem
solving.”).
112. For an argument that schools should teach alternative dispute resolution, see John
Lande & Jean R. Sternlight, The Potential Contribution of ADR to an Integrated Curriculum:
Preparing Law Students for Real World Lawyering, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 247 (2010).
The authors contend: “To be effective, attorneys must be more than legal analysts and
litigation advocates, considering that less than five percent of filed cases go to trial in many
jurisdictions, and that many tasks which lawyers work on do not even result in the filing of
litigation.” Id. at 251–52 (footnote omitted).
113. See Kenneth D. Chestek, Reality Programming Meets LRW: The Moot Case Approach to
Teaching in the First Year, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 62–63 (2002–2003) (explaining that the
“traditional first-year legal analysis, writing, and research course” concludes with an appel-
late-level assignment.).
114. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir.
1982) (commenting on the importance of boilerplate contractual terms in economic
transactions).
115. See, e.g., Charlotte S. Alexander, Learning to be Lawyers: Professional Identity and the
Law School Curriculum, 70 MD. L. REV. 465, 465 (2011) (noting one report’s findings that
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dents should learn to appreciate organizational dynamics.116  Law
practice is not a monastic pursuit, though law study often is, and the
organization of law firms and corporations can be quite complex.117
In addition, most lawyers routinely work in temporary organizations
with multiple factors of productions—for example, litigation and
transactional teams composed of different professionals from various
firms who continuously form and disband as needed.  Managing such
organizations and relationships can be challenging, and a lawyer’s
long-term career may depend on this skill as she transitions from a
skilled legal functionary to a manager of relationships and endeavors.
The deficiency is more apparent when we consider the student
who has little professional experience upon entering law school.  In
law school, there is little institutional emphasis on collaborative learn-
ing, leadership, or formal training in organizational behavior.118  It
may be that law professors lack the skill set to deliver such courses
without external assistance.  But formal course work may not be
needed.  Law schools can expose students to these issues through en-
richment programs and pedagogy.  By comparison, many business
schools institutionalize collaborative learning and team-based projects
into their curricula.119
Teamwork and collaboration also seem to come naturally for bus-
iness school graduates.  This was made clear to me as a former busi-
ness school student and as a professor.  I recently taught a course on
corporate social responsibility at University of Maryland Robert H.
Smith School of Business.  As a part of the course, I randomly as-
signed students into teams of four, and fifty percent of each student’s
final grade was based on her team’s grades.  All students accepted this
arrangement, and several indicated that another professor had done
the same.  I contrast this to my experiences with past torts classes.  In
law schools “focus[ ] exclusively on doctrine and analytical skills and for neglect[ ] the
formation of professional identity”).
116. Michael Kelly, A Gaping Hole in American Legal Education, 70 MD. L. REV. 440,
447–50 (2011).
117. See id. at 444 (explaining the importance of attending to “the ways organizations of
lawyers have become more sophisticated, aggressive, and effective”).
118. See Clifford S. Zimmerman, “Thinking Beyond My Own Interpretation”: Reflections on
Collaborative and Cooperative Learning Theory in the Law School Curriculum, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
957, 965 (1999) (explaining that “legal education, as an institution, is not receptive to the
use of collaborative or cooperative learning teaching pedagogies”); see also Rhee, M.B.A.,
supra note 5, at 22 (“Law schools can do a better job of incorporating group work, case- R
study analysis and experiential-learning methods into the structural fabric of the
curriculum.”).
119. See Elizabeth A. Reilly, Deposing the “Tyranny of Extroverts”: Collaborative Learning in the
Traditional Classroom Format, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 593, 604 (2000) (observing that collabora-
tive learning is common in business schools).
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the past, I gave midterm exams in which law students were randomly
assigned to a team whose work product determined the students’
grades.  The exams were typically worth twenty to twenty-five percent
of their grade for the course, and students were told in advance that
the grade distribution would be within a narrow range so that the
course grade would still largely depend on individual effort in the fi-
nal exam.  Nevertheless, student evaluations show that a significant
portion of the class did not like this arrangement—even though the
experience was good for them.120  There is more to this anecdote
than simply an issue of maturity or pedagogical differences.  Legal ed-
ucation prizes the thought in a lawyer’s legal analysis, which is seen as
individually produced.  But legal analysis alone does not solve
problems.121
In her symposium presentation, Professor Hadfield described an
experiment in which she conducted “an extracurricular case study ses-
sion” for law and business school students—law students in the role of
lawyers, and business students in the role of clients.122  She explained
that “law students found it very difficult to deliver the kind of creative
thinking the client was looking for and . . . the business students were
unable to extract that sort of thinking from their lawyers.”123  Lawyers
solve clients’ problems, and a necessary part of this process is positive
interaction and communication with the client.  My take from Profes-
sor Hadfield’s anecdote is that legal analysis is not a one-way flow from
the lawyer-adviser to the client-decisionmaker; instead, it is a two-way
flow between lawyer and client toward a decision that solves the cli-
ent’s problem.  Understanding this process is vital to the lawyer’s func-
tion, and one wonders whether a curriculum based on the individual
pursuit of legal analysis—typically not contextualized as a part of a
broader picture—provides the necessary exposure to organizational
behavior, leadership, and business communication.  A focus on teach-
ing legal analysis should not be seen as conflicting with teaching other
valuable professional skills.  Yet, the typical law school curriculum
120. There are several reasons for the difference in attitudes.  Business school students
are older and usually have prior professional experience.  Teamwork is also the norm for
business schools, but it is unusual in the first-year law curriculum.  Moreover, in my experi-
ence, law students are risk averse and are uncomfortable with new things, particularly when
first-year grades are so important to the trajectory of their academic careers.  Their discom-
fort is understandable.
121. See Roy Stuckey, Teaching with Purpose: Defining and Achieving Desired Outcomes in
Clinical Law Courses, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 807, 810 (2007) (“The central goal of legal educa-
tion . . . should be to teach students how to resolve legal problems.” (emphasis added)).
122. Hadfield, supra note 109, at 484. R
123. Id. at 486–87.
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largely ignores some of the “soft” skills necessary for the professional
workplace and instead almost exclusively focuses on the mantra of
“thinking like a lawyer.”124
While the first two years of law school are mostly fine, the same
cannot be said for the third year.  The third year adds a substantial
financial cost, which, at the high end, can approach $50,000.125  It
also adds a significant opportunity cost, if one believes law students
are capable of passing the bar examination after two years and of prac-
ticing law at a certain minimum level of sophistication.126  The cost
could potentially reach $100,000, including the foregone tuition, re-
duced educational debt service, and lost earnings.  I do not mean to
open up a debate on whether law school programs should be two or
three years.  Accelerated or decelerated (evening) programs notwith-
standing, law schools have traditionally been three years.  I doubt that
this will change anytime in the near future.127
Unquestionably, the third-year curriculum is problematic.  Keep-
ing in mind that law school curricula and law students are unique, I
make some general observations.  For many students, the third year is
a period of job searching and academic disengagement.128  By this
time, there is only marginal improvement in legal analytic skills,129
and many students take courses on the basis of intellectual interest,
schedule, and bar examination requirements.  Both curricular flexibil-
ity and extensive course offerings have positive attributes, but there
are downsides as well.  Often, a student’s chosen course combination
does not produce the most coherent program, thus failing to maxi-
mize the value of a third year of education.
Mitu Gulati, Richard Sander, and Robert Sockloskie suggest the
limitations of the upper-level curriculum in their empirical assessment
of third-year students’ interests:
124. See Dilloff, supra note 3, at 355; Harner, supra note 38, at 390–94. R
125. See Best Law Schools: What Are the Priciest Private Law Schools?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-
law-schools/private_cost (last visited Dec. 30, 2010) (listing yearly tuition rates at private
law schools).
126. Cf. Mitu Gulati et al., The Happy Charade: An Empirical Examination of the Third Year of
Law School, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 235, 235–36, 262 (2001) (describing recent proposals to
eliminate the third year and speculating that “a majority of law students would support
abolishing the third year”).
127. See id. at 262 (“Eliminating the third year outright would reduce law school reve-
nues by one-third and, presumably, would reduce faculty sizes by nearly that amount.”).
128. See id. at 244–47 (presenting data suggesting third-year disengagement).
129. Cf. Paul Barron, Can Anything Be Done to Make the Upper-Level Law School Courses More
Interesting?, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1881, 1881 & n.3 (1996) (suggesting that “interest level and
participation” decreases in the third year).
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[M]any of the satisfied students in the law school main-
stream appear to be willing and eager to do more in their
second and third years (especially the third), if provided with
the opportunity to pursue real interests and develop new, cli-
ent-oriented skills.  A significant number of students want
more (and better) clinical offerings and business skills train-
ing. They also appear eager to help others and are seeking
opportunities to do pro bono work.  This suggests to us that
the upper years of law school could be reformed to be more
than the back end of a credentialing process.130
Experiential learning, skills development, and a greater focus on cur-
ricular choice make sense in any educational setting.131
Law schools can take a greater role in steering students toward
better curricular choices.  For example, consider the field of business
law with a focus on corporate transactions.  In this area, a law student
should complete some substantial package of courses from the follow-
ing menu: business associations, corporate finance, contract drafting,
securities regulation, mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcy, advanced
tax, and business planning.  Training in essential business concepts,
such as accounting and finance, should also be required.132  Corpo-
rate transactional lawyers are not simply custodians of standard-form
documents or cut-and-paste functionaries.  They must be technically
proficient at maximizing transactional value.133
The third-year curriculum might achieve this by introducing in-
terdisciplinary learning through joint programs with other profes-
sional and academic institutions.  Our world is becoming increasingly
complex, and legal work must address this complexity.134  Lawyers
should be sensitive to the application of other disciplines to legal
130. Gulati et al., supra note 126, at 259. R
131. See, e.g., Brook K. Baker, Beyond MacCrate: The Role of Context, Experience, Theory, and
Reflection in Ecological Learning, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 287, 354 (1994) (emphasizing the impor-
tance of practice-based settings and suggesting that “law students can learn about the situ-
ated roles, judgments, and actions of lawyers, judges, jurors, and witnesses only if they
experience these human actors and human events from the inside of legal culture rather
than at its fringes”).
132. See Rhee, Madoff, supra note 5, at 381 (advocating interdisciplinary education for R
business lawyers); Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC.
342, 352 (2005) (arguing that in the future business lawyers will require more “technical
proficiency in finance and economics”).
133. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,
94 YALE L.J. 239, 243 (1984) (arguing that business lawyers are “transaction cost engineers”
who maximize the value of transactions). See generally Rhee, Madoff, supra note 5 (arguing R
that a deficiency in legal education contributed to the failure of lawyer-regulators in the
Madoff scandal).
134. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. R
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problem solving.135  Crossdisciplinary expertise can be acquired not
only through training and experience but also through a formal edu-
cational environment.136  This observation is consistent with the move-
ment toward interdisciplinary scholarship in the legal academy.  But
given that it takes considerable time and effort to learn legal analysis,
the only time to introduce interdisciplinary learning in any substantial
way is the third year of law school.
Finally, another wrinkle common to contemporary, sophisticated
legal practice is the importance of international work.  Globalization
and internationalization of business are reality.  Global business and
regulation depend on a diverse group of people, cultures, nationali-
ties, and languages.137  This potential complexity suggests the need to
teach international aspects of legal practice to students, exposing
them to the reality of the practice.138
V. SOME PROPOSALS FOR CURRICULAR REFORM
My main criticism of legal education is that it can be more effec-
tive in training market-ready lawyers, and law schools should do more
to prepare students fully for practice.  If our model for legal education
remains unchanged, a two year program might be a better option for
many students given the enormous cost of the third year and the in-
creasing problem of student debt burden.
135. See Janet Weinstein, Coming of Age: Recognizing the Importance of Interdisciplinary Educa-
tion in Law Practice, 74 WASH. L. REV. 319, 324, 340 (1999) (observing that “[l]ack of expo-
sure to other disciplines during the [legal] training process gives the implicit message that
these disciplines are unimportant to the solving of legal problems”).
136. See id. at 354–56 (describing a model interdisciplinary training program involving
“a two semester course for law students and graduate students in social work and psychol-
ogy,” taught by professors “from all three disciplines,” and supplemented by visits from
experts in “medicine and law enforcement”).  Many schools offer joint degree programs.
For example, Northwestern University and University of Pennsylvania offer accelerated
joint J.D./M.B.A. programs. See KELLOGG SCH. MGMT. JD-MBA PROGRAM, http://www.kel-
logg.northwestern.edu/jdmba/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2010); PENN LAW: GOAT, https://goat.
law.upenn.edu/ACADEMICS/JOINTDEGREEPROGRAMS/WebPages/JDMBA.aspx (last
visited Dec. 30, 2010).  Such programs are more cost effective in terms of tuition and op-
portunity cost.
137. See, e.g., Donald B. King, Globalization Thinking for Modern Legal Education, in LEGAL
EDUCATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 393, 399 (Donald B. King ed., 1999) (noting that inter-
national parties who engage in trade with China must look not only to China’s “civil law of
contracts” but also to its “foreign trade law on contracts”).
138. See, e.g., id. at 393, 412 (proposing a new model for legal education that requires
“the incorporation of the approaches of different legal systems, and the incorporation of
globalized human values,” and arguing that this “globalization thinking” renders lawyers’
thinking more flexible and provides them with the broad perspective necessary to meet
their professional obligation to improve the law).
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Some have argued that modern legal education requires a
stronger connection between theory and practice.139  As implemented
in many schools, the division between theory and practice roughly co-
incides with the division between doctrinal faculty members in one
group and clinical and legal writing faculty members in another
group.  The traditional law school curriculum emphasizes analytical,
theoretical thinking in accordance with the mantra of “thinking like a
lawyer.”  The chief pedagogical tools—the Socratic method or a mix
of lecture and discussion—aim to hone this skill.140  This model is re-
vered in legal education, and it is the method by which most law
professors have been trained.141
On the practical side of the theory-practice gap, law schools also
provide experiential learning options.  In recent years, clinical educa-
tion has gained strength and prominence in the legal academy.142
Moreover, several law schools, such as Northeastern University School
of Law and Drexel University Earle Mack School of Law, have begun
to offer externship opportunities as a serious part of their curricula.143
Although these law schools continue to train students to think like a
lawyer, their practice-based programs provide the opportunity to do
like a lawyer.
This division along pedagogical functionality—between theory
and practice—is an oversimplification.  Consider first the theory com-
ponent.  Three years of teaching the same analytical method in the
context of different substantive bodies of law is repetitive.  The third
139. See Christine M. Szaj, Building Bridges and Connecting Dots: Easing the Transition from
Law School to Law Practice, in LEGAL EDUCATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 137, at R
119, 120, 125 (noting that “law schools [have] attempt[ed] to minimize the gap between
theory and practice” and concluding that “it cannot be argued persuasively that one is
more important than the other”).
140. See Rhee, Socratic Method, supra note 5, at 882 (describing the Socratic method as “a R
concrete analytic tool”).
141. See Burnele V. Powell, A Defense of the Socratic Method: An Interview with Martin B.
Louis (1934–94), 73 N.C. L. REV. 957, 962 (1995) (quoting Professor Martin B. Louis as
stating that the Socratic Method is “a superior learning method for most students”).
142. See, e.g., Clinical and Pro Bono Programs, HARV. L. SCH., http://www.law.harvard.edu/
academics/clinical/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2010) (describing Harvard’s clinical legal educa-
tion program).
143. See Bluhm Legal Clinic, NW. L., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/extern
ships/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2010) (describing externship opportunities); Experience the Dif-
ference: Hands-On Education, EARLE MACK SCH. OF  LAW DREXEL U., http://www.earlemack
law.drexel.edu/admissions/difference/experiential_learning/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2010)
(listing  “practical learning” opportunities).  Washington & Lee University School of Law
recently revamped its third-year curriculum to incorporate a substantial experiential learn-
ing component. See Washington & Lee’s New Third Year Reform, WASH. & LEE U. SCH. OF
LAW, http://law.wlu.edu/thirdyear/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2010).
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year represents the point of diminishing returns.144  The framework
for conducting discrete legal analysis is based on the doctrinal skill of
reading cases, statutes, and regulations.  This skill is mostly acquired
after two years of law school.145  This fact is even more critical now
because the cost of legal education has ballooned, making the oppor-
tunity cost more significant.146
Now consider the practice component.  Clinical education is a
good way for students to experience the practice of law under careful
and expert faculty supervision.147  But there are limitations to prac-
tice-based teaching.  Clinical education most naturally is given in the
context of litigation.  It is limited by budgetary and other resource
constraints, suggesting that it is ultimately financed by student tui-
tion.148  An important economic consideration is the need for a low
student to faculty ratio in clinical teaching, given that faculty salary is
the largest expense in a law school’s operating budget.149  Moreover,
while clinics enable students to practice law, they are not a substitute
for immersion in the practice of law, which is the steepest part of the
learning curve for new lawyers.150  There simply is no substitute for
the experience gained from an intense, less controlled environment
in which the professional, sometimes without tight supervision or
handholding, must solve problems as they arise with smarts, sweat,
and independent judgment.  Clinics provide only the training wheels
for this eventuality.
144. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text. R
145. Some have suggested that two years of law school as a formal classroom experience
may be sufficient. See, e.g., Thomas S. Ulen, The Impending Train Wreck in Current Legal
Education: How We Might Teach Law as the Scientific Study of Social Governance, 6 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 302, 331 (2009) (noting that some have suggested a two year program (citing
RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 281 (1999))).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 126–27. R
147. See Gulati et al., supra note 126, at 262–63 (arguing that “clinical education may R
indeed have the potential to fill much of the third-year void”).
148. See Marjorie Anne McDiarmid, What’s Going on Down There in the Basement: In-House
Clinics Expand Their Beachhead, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 239, 286 (1990) (stating that “live-
client, in-house clinics probably are still more expensive than most other teaching method-
ologies” despite rising costs in alternative teaching methods).
149. See James H. Backman, Law School Externships: Reevaluating Compensation Policies to
Permit Paid Externships, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 21, 34 (2010) (“One of the problems in deliver-
ing these in-house clinics is the high cost for the law schools because of the necessarily low
student/faculty ratios involved.”).
150. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance
Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1233 (1991) (noting that
recent law school graduates “complain about . . . their lack of preparation for what the
practice of law truly entails” and suggesting that “the gap between the students’ antiquated,
idealized view of the law and the actual legal world they enter causes unexpected
dissatisfaction”).
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The problem with legal education arises from contradictions.
There is too much theory; there is too little theory.  There is not
enough practice; practice is not enough.  These contradictions are
made more pronounced by a unitary vision of the legal profession and
education.
Traditional legal analysis founded on doctrine and litigation-fo-
cused policy arguments, while being the foundational skill of an
American lawyer, may be insufficient for training the twenty-first cen-
tury lawyer whose practice environment is far more complex than it
has ever been.151  Sophisticated clients require core competencies that
are not adequately taught in law schools.  Some law schools have rec-
ognized this problem.  For instance, former Dean David Van Zandt of
Northwestern University Law School consulted with law firms, govern-
ment agencies, nonprofit organizations, and private companies and
identified the competencies that his law school seeks to teach its law
students: teamwork, communication, basic quantitative analysis, basic
strategic thinking, project management skills, and globalization.152
This program of skills development borrows heavily from business
schools, and it identifies some essential deficiencies in legal
education.
What can law schools do to close the training gap and produce
more market-ready lawyers?  At least in the short term, they can ad-
dress some needs without doing violence to the overall educational
architecture.
First, they can create more opportunities for interdisciplinary and
concentrated study programs.153  The selection of specialty fields
might include business, healthcare, tax, environmental, and intellec-
tual property law.  These fields benefit from a structured curriculum.
Interdisciplinary learning could be introduced, and it seems that
course offerings and textbooks on teaching interdisciplinary tools are
increasing.154  A focus on quantitative concepts would provide a valua-
151. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 135, at 319–20 (discussing the importance of inter- R
disciplinary legal education in an increasingly complex world).
152. David E. Van Zandt, The Evolution of J.D. Programs—Is Non-Traditional Becoming
More Traditional?: Keynote Address Transcript, 38 SW. L. REV. 607, 613–15 (2009).
153. See Gulati et al., supra note 126, at 264–66 (suggesting that law schools introduce R
course subjects from other programs and offer concentrated study programs).
154. See, e.g., HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS v (2003)
(“Lawyers . . . must work in settings where effective argumentation and the giving of sound
legal advice often depend on mastery of language and techniques derived from disciplines
such as economics, accounting, finance, and statistics, staples of the modern business
school curriculum, but notably absent . . . from law school classrooms.”); ROBERT M. LAW-
LESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW xix–xx (2010) (describing a course taught by the
authors on empirical research techniques).
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ble perspective.  Moreover, even outside of joint degree programs, for-
mal relationships with other graduate schools makes sense in some
areas, such as business (corporate law), medicine (health law), and
engineering (intellectual property law).  Increased access to courses
in other schools and disciplines would facilitate interdisciplinary
studies.
Second, law schools can expose students to the international as-
pects of law and the reality of a globalized economy.  Such interna-
tional exposure might be achieved through some combination of
formal coursework or other structured programs.155  A diverse student
body can itself provide significant exposure as well.
Third, law schools can introduce teamwork and leadership com-
ponents into their curricula without losing sight of the all-important
goal of teaching legal analysis.  There is no reason why law students
cannot learn legal analysis in the context of group work or in a simula-
tion of the more complex production of professional work.156  Legal
analysis and collaborative learning are not mutually exclusive.
Finally, law schools can introduce different pedagogies. After the
first year, there is no reason why doctrinal courses should be taught
primarily through the traditional Socratic dialogue or lecture.  For ex-
ample, students can benefit from the case method, which is different
from case analysis.157  Judges, as well as casebook authors, sanitize the
facts of judicial opinions.  A simplifying ex post bias is inherent in
such analysis, but the real world is invariably messy from the ex ante
view.  In contrast, business school-style case studies provide a rich mi-
lieu of complex factual problems without the sort of prepackaged so-
lutions inherent in the analysis section of appellate opinions.
Similarly, transactional law can be taught through role playing and
155. See King, supra note 137, at 414–15 (suggesting ways to incorporate “globalization R
thinking” into the legal curriculum).
156. See, e.g., Gulati et al., supra note 126, at 265 n.48 (noting that Vanderbilt Law R
School “has set up a series of law-and-business classes that are jointly run by law and busi-
ness school faculty and use many aspects of the business school teaching model”).
157. A major impediment for doing this is a lack of teaching materials.  Through the
Harvard Business School, business schools have a large repository of case materials. See
Cases, HARV. BUS. PUBLISHING, http://hbsp.harvard.edu/product/cases (last visited Dec.
31, 2010) (selling various case studies).  Law schools have historically relied on casebooks
of edited appellate opinions, so there is a dearth of case studies available to legal educa-
tors.  Nevertheless, Stanford Law School has made an effort to write and collect them. See
Stanford Law School Case Studies Collection, SLS HOME: PUBS & BLOGS, http://www.law.stan-
ford.edu/publications/casestudies/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2010) (providing an overview of
its “Case Studies Collection”).  Emulating the business school case study, I have written
case studies as a part of my scholarly efforts. See Rhee, supra note 41, at 664–96 (presenting R
a case study of the 2008–2009 merger of Bank of America and Merrill Lynch and an analy-
sis of the fiduciary duty issues).
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mock documents rather than through case law analysis.158  The Rules
of Civil Procedure can be taught through a case simulation.  Negotia-
tions and alternative dispute resolution can be taught through a com-
bination of simulations and reflective learning—and indeed, many
courses in negotiations are already taught in this manner.
All of the previous suggestions are feasible.  I now turn to legal
education reform that is plausible but less conventional.  Recall the
assertion that the distance between academics and practice is more
pronounced in law than it is in business and medicine.  Medical
school curricula have both a clinical component and a residency re-
quirement, and the traditional business education is sandwiched be-
tween substantial professional experiences.159  Law schools seem more
disconnected from the market.  There should be ways to bridge this
gap.
Law schools and firms can pursue joint strategies toward training.
For instance, consider law firms’ summer associate programs, which
serve as devices for identifying the best law school candidates for per-
manent associate positions.  There are significant costs associated with
running these programs, such as paying the salaries of first-year associ-
ates on a pro rata basis for second-year law students and devoting at-
torneys’ time to supervise and advise students.  Suppose that, in
addition to these programs, law firms and law schools were to coordi-
nate substantial, experiential learning summer programs for school
credit that mimicked associate level work.  Such a program would be
similar to an externship, but the coordination between organizations
would be greater.  Law schools would screen applications based on the
law firm’s requirements, and sponsoring firms would commit to work-
ing with school faculty on a structured practicum.  There would be
educational benefits, of course, but there would also be a real connec-
tion to employment opportunities for students and potential research
opportunities for faculty members with more practice-driven scholarly
agendas.  This is just one of many possible ways to better connect law
practice, legal education, and scholarship.
We can envision even more speculative proposals for legal educa-
tion reform.  One possibility is an alternative third-year curriculum in
which, for instance, students work as lawyer-trainees under the super-
vision of a sponsor-employer in an apprenticeship similar to the Brit-
158. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 109. R
159. See supra note 18. R
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ish model.160  They would be paid a trainee wage—a real salary, but
one reflecting a training period.161  At the same time, students would
attend law school and take courses better suited for their chosen prac-
tices, much in the same way that evening students work during the day
and study at night.162  A hybrid program combining the British model
with an accelerated evening and weekend program would allow stu-
dents to accomplish multiple goals: students can immerse themselves
in legal practice; with a structured third-year curriculum, they gain
necessary and foundational knowledge as their careers progress; and,
they reap the benefits of a salary, which enables them to pay tuition
immediately rather than simply paying tuition and biding time until
their professional certification is completed with a passing grade on
the bar exam.  Legal employers, too, might be interested in such a
program: It furthers their employees’ education, it extends the period
for evaluating potential hires, and it allows employers to train job can-
didates at cost-effective rates that are easier to justify to clients.
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent market downturn has had a significant impact on the
legal profession.  I do not know whether these changes are temporary
or permanent, though I suspect that some will endure. The legal mar-
ket will be subject to pricing pressures if there are significant advances
in the methods for evaluating legal services.  Clients’ increased drive
to rationalize legal services may result in less funding for training.
Law schools have long been criticized for being disconnected
from the legal market.  The current model of American legal educa-
tion may be effective in teaching law students the skills and knowledge
necessary for the average practice, but it is costly and inefficient.  Cer-
160. See Andrew Boon & Julian Webb, Legal Education and Training in England and Wales:
Back to the Future?, 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 79, 82 (2008) (explaining that English lawyers-in-
training must undergo a supervised practice apprenticeship).
161. See id. at 112 (noting that large firms in England now “pay their trainees’ training
expenses as well as significant salaries”).
162. While this would be a demanding schedule, it is feasible.  The University of Mary-
land Robert H. Smith School of Business has an accelerated M.B.A. program in which
professionals take concentrated courses during the evenings and weekends, completing a
full M.B.A. program in two years. See Program Comparison Matrix: Which Smith M.B.A. Pro-
gram is Right For You?, U. MD. ROBERT H. SMITH SCH. BUSINESS, http://www.rhsmith.umd.
edu/mba/programs/chart.aspx (last visited Dec. 31, 2010).  I taught the program’s corpo-
rate social responsibility course, and my students told me that the program is hard but
manageable.  Of course, this analogy between the situations of business and law students
has limits, since most business students already have prior professional experience.  In the
proposal here, a mix of daytime work and nighttime study may actually have a net educa-
tional benefit for law students due to the mix of practice and school.
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tainly, the disconnect between law schools and the legal market affects
the quality of education for students who will practice in sophisticated
legal environments.  For those students, deeper training in substantive
fields of law and other disciplines is required.  Students can also bene-
fit from an immersion experience in the practice of law, and this sug-
gests that cooperation between law schools and the legal market could
prove to be mutually beneficial.
